MONETARY POLICY AND THE EXCHANGE RATE DURING THE ASIAN CRISIS:

IDENTIFICATION THROUGH HETEROSCEDASTIC ITY

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Abstract

This paper examines whether a monetary policy tightening (i.e., an increase in the domestic interestrate) was successful in defending the exchange rate from speculative pressures during the Asian financial crisis. We estimate a bivariate VECM for four Asian countries, and improve upon existing studies in two important ways. First, by using a long data span we are able to compare the effects of an interest rate rise on the nom inal exchange rate during tranquil and turbulent periods. Second, we take into account the endogeneity of interest rates and identify the system by exploiting the heteroscedasticity properties of the relevant time series, as suggested by Sentana and Fiorentini (2001). We find that while tight monetary policy helped to defend the exchange rate during tranquil periods, it had the opposite effect during the Asian crisis.

Keywords: Monetary Policy, Financial Crisis, Identification

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1.Introduction

The nature of the relationship between exchange rates and interest rates during the A sian financial crisis has been much debated by the W orld Bank, the M F and the U S Treasury, and has important policy implications. W hile the M F has argued that steep rises in interest rates were vital in stabilizing A sian exchange rates, the W orld Bank position, partly reflecting the views of its form er chief econom ist Joseph Stiglitz, has been that interest rate hikes destabilized the currencies further by increasing the risk of bankruptcy, which led to further loss of confidence in these econom ies (see Stiglitz, 1999). D raw ing out policy lessons from episodes such as the A sian crisis is clearly vital for safeguarding international financial stability in the future.

This paper aim s at contributing to this key policy debate by providing new empirical evidence on whether higher interest rates were in fact successful in defending A sian exchange rates from speculative pressures during the crisis period. We improve upon existing studies in two in portant ways. First, by using a long data span we are able to exam ine the effects of an interest rate rise on the nom inal exchange rate during tranquil periods and to compare them with those during more turbulent periods. Second, we adopt an appropriate identification scheme. Specifically, we estimate a bivariate Vector Enor Connection (VECM) model for four A sian countries in order to capture the relationship between the exchange rate and the interest rate. The identification of the system is achieved by taking into account the heteroscedasticity properties of the time series under investigation, following Sentana and Fiorentini (2001). This method enables us to address the endogeneity of interest rates, a thorny econom etric problem under any circum stances, but especially acute during periods of speculative attacks. This is in marked contrast to earlier empirical studies, most of which either did not recognize or were unable to address this serious econom etric problem, which can be a source of biased estimates.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing theoretical and empirical literature, and outlines the methodological issues which a rigorous empirical analysis needs to address. Section 3 explains the empirical methodology used to identify the model, which exploits the heteroscedasticity properties of the series. Section 4 gives details of the data and the equations to be

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estimated. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 6 offers som e concluding remarks.

2.Literature Review and Methodological Issues

Existing Literature

The traditional view on the relationship between monetary policy and the exchange rate, on which the IMF position is based, is that a tightmonetary policy strengthens the exchange rate by sending a signal that the authorities are committed to maintaining a fixed rate, thereby increasing capital inflows (Backus and Driffill, 1985). A number of authors, how ever, have argued against the signaling value of a monetary tightening. Obstfeld (1994), Drazen and Masson (1994), and Bensaid and Jeanne (1997) provide a theoretical fram ew ork where the policym akers face a tradeoff when pegging the exchange rate. The nature of the trade-off varies across m odels but they all have a common flavor. On the one hand, letting the exchange rate float in plies a fixed cost arising from the loss of credibility. This cost reflects the fact that policymakers have to abandon their disinflation goal linked to an exchange rate anchor. On the other hand, the cost of maintaining the peg is associated with either the output costs of an overvalued currency, or the excess current deficit resulting from it, or the budgetary consequences of the higher interest rates needed to defend the currency. This fram ework has been associated with self-fulfilling currency crises because the relative cost of defending the currency increases substantially during a speculative attack, and policym akers m ay choose to abandon the peg once the attack OCCUITS

In the case of the A sian financial crisis, a number of econom ists, including Radelet and Sachs (1998), Feldstein (1998), Furm an and Stiglitz (1998) and Stiglitz (1999), argued against the signaling value of tighter monetary policy by pointing out the effects of higher interest rates on the probability of bankruptcy of highly leveraged borrow ers. These manifest them selves in the form of a larger country risk premium, a low er, possibly negative, expected return to investors, and capital flight, all of which generate dow nw and pressure on the exchange rate. The role played by banks' and firm s' balance sheets has been analysed by Stiglitz (1999) in a partial equilibrium m odel. M ore recently, G ertler et al. (2000) have stressed the perverse effect of a tight m onetary policy occurring through the balance sheet channel in the context of a general equilibrium model. This is essentially a small open economy macromodel incorporating "a financial accelerator" mechanism (see also Bernanke and Gertler, 1999). Thus, the "revisionist" view predicts a "foreign exchange-interest rate Laffer curve". The foundations of this view have, how ever, been criticized by K rugm an (1998), who argues that even very high interest rates might be preferable to a free fall in the exchange rate in countries with a large external debt denom inated in foreign currency.¹

The available empirical evidence is mixed. Empirical studies based on panel data analysis tend to support the revisionist view, while studies based on VAR model specifications provide conflicting results. Goldfajn and Gupta (1999a,b), using monthly data from 80 countries covering the period of 1980–98, find that the probability of currency appreciation conditional on a tight monetary policy is much bwer in countries (such as the those in EastA sia) with a weak banking sector. K raay (1999) examines factors determining whether or not defences of a fixed peg against speculative attack succeed. U sing monthly observations, he instruments for the policy endogeneity of interest rates, and finds, in a sample of 75 developed and developing countries, that a tightmonetary policy does not increase the likelihood of a successful defense. Furm an and Stiglitz (1998) examine nine emerging markets with episodes of temporarily high interest rates. U sing simple regression analysis, they find that both the magnitude and duration of such interest rate hikes are associated with exchange rate depreciation.

Dekle et al (1998), using high-frequency (weekly) data, find that in the case of K orea the increase in the interest rate differential helped to appreciate the K orean W on. The analysis of B asurto and G osh (2000), based on m onthly data for Indonesia, K orea and Thailand, provides little evidence that higher real interest rates resulted in a higher risk prem ium, whilst they appear to be associated with an appreciation of the currency. Tanner's (1999) empirical study, which uses m onthly data, focuses on an index of the exchange m arket pressure, which is measured by the sum of exchange

¹ The focus of this paper is on the interest rate exchange rate relationship. O ther important monetary policy issues in the afterm ath of currency crises are evaluating whether the real exchange rate (RER) has overshot and has become undervalued with respect to its long-run equilibrium; whether nom inal currency appreciation or higher dom estic inflation should be used as a means to bring it back to

rate depreciation and reserve outflows. Exam ining individual and pooled estimates of a VAR model estimated for Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, the author (op. cit.) finds that a contractionary monetary policy helps to reduce exchange rate market pressure.

On the other hand, the VAR model estimation and impulse response analysis of Goldfain and Baig (1998), based on daily data, provide evidence of a perverse effect of a tight monetary policy on the exchange rate in Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, K orea and M alaysia. G ould and K am in (1999) use G ranger causality test on weekly observations on interest and exchange rates for six countries: Indonesia, Korea, M alaysia, Philippines, Thailand and M exico. They find that during financial crises exchange rates are not significantly affected in any of the countries examined by changes in interest rates. A similar finding is reported in Ohno, Shirono and Sisly (1999), who apply the Toda and Y am am oto (1995) m ethodology (which allows to test Granger causality regardless of the order of integration of the time series) to daily observations on interest rates and exchange rates in Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, M alaysia, Taiw an and Singapore. Finally, the evidence in Cho and West (2001), who solve the identification problem by proposing a methodology mapping second moments to the point estimates of the relevant coefficients using structural restrictions, is mixed. Specifically, their main finding is that an exogenous increase in interest rates led to exchange rate appreciation in K orea and the Philippines, and to a depreciation in Thailand. How ever, as the authors recognize, the confidence intervals around the point estim ates are very large, suggesting a cautious interpretation of their findings.

M ethodological Issues

Three in portant issues need to be addressed by an empirical study of the effects of m onetary policy on exchange rates. The first one relates to the likely endogeneity of m onetary policy, the second to the m easurem ent of the m onetary policy stance, and the third to the possibility of regime switches. We discuss each of them in the remainder of this section.

equilibrium ; and finally, the costs of raising interest rates in term s of output losses and financial system fragility (see G oldfajn and B aig, 1998).

Perhaps the most important empirical challenge is the identification of monetary policy exogenous shocks as distinct from monetary policy actions (see also K raay, 1999²). Policy makers' actions to some extent respond to current developments in the economy, such as a speculative attack on the currency. This response may be captured by a policy reaction function and is distinct from exogenous policy shocks, which are defined as deviations of the authorities' behavior from their rule. In other words, an identification scheme is needed to solve the simultaneity problem between policy instruments and other endogenous variables, such as exchange rates, to which monetary policy systematically reacts. Pastem pirical studies of the A sian crisis based on VAR analysis do not explicitly recognize the simultaneous feedback between exchange rates and interest rates. By contrast, in the present paper we are able to identify the effects of an interest rates rise on the exchange rate by taking into account the heteroscedasticity property of the time series under investigation, following the method put forward by Sentana and Fiorentini (2001).

A coording to Goldfain and Baig (1998), the ex-ante real interest rate is the most appropriate measure of the tightness or boseness of monetary policy³. However, while this may in principle be a valid econom ic argument, in practice there are thorny measurement issues associated with obtaining accurate measures of the real rate of interest. Because inflation expectations generally are not observed directly, this frequently leads to using ex-post measures of the real interest rate, by using realised rather than expected inflation. Unfortunately, as Gould and K am in (1999) point out, while actual inflation may be an adequate proxy for inflation expectations during tranquil periods, it may diverge considerably from inflation expectations during financial crises that involve sharp depreciations of the exchange rate. Such depreciations may cause shortbursts of inflation that lead to ex-post real interest rates may have been raised substantially. Thus, the results of studies that rely on ex-post measures of the real interest rate as indicators of the monetary stance may be m isleading. W e, therefore, utilize the nom inal interest rate in our estim ations, which

² This author uses an instrum ental variable technique by employing changes in foreign reserves and changes in the country borrowing from the IMF as instrum ents. However, these are likely to be imperfect instrum ents, since they are unlikely to be exogenous during speculative attacks.

³ Som e authors (e.g. Tanner, 1999; Basurto and Ghosh, 2000), also suggest using other monetary indicators to capture the stance of monetary policy, such as foreign reserves and credit aggregates.

we believe is the most accurate and widely available indicator of the stance of monetary policy.

Finally, the possibility of asymmetries also needs to be taken into account, as K raay (1999) points out. In particular, regime switches are likely to occur over longer time periods. W hilst the empirical studies reviewed above focus on the crisis period only, we use a long data span, which enables us to compare the relationship between exchange rates and interest rates in tranquil and turbulent periods. W e, therefore, model policy shifts by defining appropriate dummies, which are fully described in Section 4.

3.Em pirical M ethodology: Identification through H eteroscedasticity

Given the n×1 vector of endogenous variables Z_t , consider the structural VAR of orderp:

$$AZ_{t} = B(L)Z_{t-1} + e_{t}$$
 (1)

where B(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator, A is the nXn matrix which captures the contemporaneous interaction between the variables included in Z_t , and ε_t is the vector of structural innovations. It is usually assumed that the structural innovations are unconditionally and conditionally orthogonal. Therefore both the unconditional covariance matrix $E(\varepsilon_i \varepsilon_i^t) = \Gamma$ and the conditional covariance matrix $E_{t-1}(\varepsilon_i \varepsilon_i^t) = \Gamma_t$ are diagonal. Furthermore, the unconditional variance of the structural innovations is normalised to unity, and, consequently, $E(\varepsilon_i \varepsilon_i^t) = L$, where I is an identity matrix. The corresponding reduced form of the model in (1) is:

$$Z_{t} = C (L)Z_{t-1} + n_{t}$$
 (2)

The unconditional and conditional covariance matrices of the reduced form innovations v_t are $E(v_t v_t) = \Sigma$, and $E_{t-1}(v_t v_t) = \Sigma_t$, respectively. If the residuals are hom osceedastic, then $\Sigma_t = \Sigma$, whereas, under conditional heterosceedasticity, $\Sigma_t \neq \Sigma$. Under hom osceedasticity, there exists a time invariant orthogonal transform ations such that $Av_t = \varepsilon_t$ is observationally equivalent to $A^*v_t = \varepsilon_t^*$, where $A^* = (Q^{-1})A$, $\varepsilon_t^* = Q\varepsilon_t$,

and Q is an arbitrary non-thogonal matrix. The observational equivalence occurs since both ε_t and the corresponding orthogonal rotated innovations ε_t^* in ply that $\Sigma = A^{-1}(A^{-1})' = (A^*)^{-1}(A^*)^{-1}'$. In order to (exactly) identify the matrix A, we need n^2 restrictions. It is custom any to impose, as a set of identifying restrictions, the normalisation to unity of the elements of main diagonal of Γ , and to assume orthogonal structural innovations. This provides a set of n(n+1)/2 restrictions and, therefore, it is not sufficient to identify the parameters.

Traditional VAR models of monetary policy are based on Bernanke's (1986) methodology which provides the remaining n(n+1)/2 identifying restrictions by imposing a recursive structure on the impact multiplier matrix A. However, this identifying scheme, which is rationalized in terms of informational delays in the monetary authorities feedback rules, is hard to justify in open economies, where mutual contemporaneous feedback between interest rates and exchange rates may be more plausible. Smets (1996, 1997) and K im and Roubini (2000) propose a non-recursive identifying scheme for a VAR including a few other variables in addition to interest and exchange rates. Bagliano and Favero (1999) use a non-VAR measure of monetary policy shocks to explicitly address the identification problem arising from the simultaneity of interest rates and exchange rates. They consider the US-G erm any case, and derive a direct measure of G erm an monetary policy shocks by using information extracted from financialm arkets.

In this paper we follow the suggestions of Sentana and Fiorentini (2001)⁴, which enable us to identify a bivariate VECM model including interest rates and exchange rates only by considering the tim e-varying conditional variances properties of the two financial series. Under conditional heteroscedasticity, $Av_t=\varepsilon_t$ is not observationally equivalent to $A_t^*v_t=\varepsilon_t^*$, where $A_t^*=(Q^{-1})\Gamma_t^{-1/2}tA$ and $\varepsilon_t^*=Q\Gamma_t^{-1/2}t\varepsilon_t$. Observational equivalence does not occur since, unlike in the hom oscedastic case, the orthogonal rotations of the vector of structural innovations ε_t are different in each time period, given that the conditional covariance matrix Γ_t , and, consequently, A_t^* , are time-varying (for details, see Sentana and Fiorentini, 2001).

⁴ Rigobon (2000) provides an alternative identification scheme based on heteroscedasticity. See King, Sentana, Wadhwani (1994) and Normandin and Phaneuf (1997) for empirical applications of the Sentana-Fiorentiniapproach.

4.Data and EmpiricalM odel

The analysis was carried out using monthly data for the period 1991:2-2001:10. The countries under investigation are those which experienced a tem porary and significant monetary policy tightening during the A sian financial crisis: Thailand, South K orea, Indonesia and the Philippines. The bilateral nom inal exchange rate series are defined as units of dom estic currency per US dollar. The dom estic interest rate series used are the K orean call overnight rate, the Indonesian interbank call rate, the Philippines interbank call ban rate, and the Thai reportate, which are the relevant policy interest rates in each case. The US federal funds rate is used as the foreign interest rate. All series were obtained from Datastream.

Som e unit root pre-testing analysis was carried out, show ing evidence of a unit root in each series.⁵ In each case the conditional mean equations are specified as a VECM :

$$\Delta x_{1} = b_{12} * \Delta i_{t}^{d} + b_{12,D} * \Delta i_{t}^{d} * Dum 1 + a_{1} * (i_{t-1} - i_{t-1}^{f} - b_{0} - b_{0,D} * Dum 1) + d_{1} \Delta i_{t}^{f} + e_{1t}$$
(3)

$$\Delta i_{t}^{d} = b_{21} * \Delta x_{t} + b_{21,D} * \Delta x_{t} * Dum 1 + a_{2} \Delta i_{t}^{f} + e_{2t}$$

The two endogenous variables are a proxy for the nom inal exchange rate depreciation rate (in percent values), that is $100 \times \Delta e_t$, where Δe_t is the first-order difference of the log of the nom inal bilateral exchange rate (w ith respect to the US dollar), and Δi_t the first-order difference of the dom estic short-term interest rate. The US federal funds rate, f_t , is treated as a strictly exogenous regressor.

To take into account policy shifts, particularly the tightening of monetary policy that took place in the four countries under investigation in an attempt to halt the slide of the exchange rate during the crisis, we introduce an intervention dummy Dum1. Inspection of the data presented in Figures 1-4 suggests defining it in the following way in each case:

Thailand:	1 during the Aug97-Dec97 and Feb98-Ju198 period, and 0 elsew here.
Koræa:	1 during the Dec97-M ay 98 period, and 0 elsew here.
Indonesia:	1 during the $Aug97$ -Jul99 period, and 0 elsewhere.
Philippines:	1 during the Jul97-0 ct97 period, and 0 elsew here.

In the first stage of the empirical analysis, it was found that the interest parity condition holds in the long-run in both Indonesia and the Philippines. In the case of Thailand and K orea, how ever, we detected that the interest parity condition holds for the post-crisis period only if an additional shift in the mean is taken into account. These intercept shifts are usually interpretable as changes in the country risk prem ium (see O bstfeld and R ogoff, 1996), which mainly reflect the monetary policy tightening in the presence of speculative attacks. Thus, an additional intervention dummy (D um 2) is defined that takes the value 1 from N ov98 onwards, and 0 elsewhere in the case of Thailand, and value 1 from Feb99 onwards and 0 elsewhere for K orea.

The estim ated equilibrium relationships included in the VECM s are:

Thailand:	(i _t -i _t -2.62-11.81*DUM 1+6.60*DUM 2)
Korea:	(^{fl} _t -f _t -739-1215*DUM 1+815*DUM 2)
Indonesia:	(f _t -f _t -7.08-37.10*DUM 1)

Philippines: $(\hat{t}_{t}^{d} - \hat{t}_{t}^{f} - 7.66 - 34.19 \times DUM 1)$

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These relationships are plausible, suggesting sharp increases in the country risk premia during the crisis period, with Indonesia and the Philippines experiencing the largest increases, amounting to 37% and 34% respectively, compared with around

⁵ A n augm ented D ickey Fuller testw as carried out. R esults are available upon request.

12% in the case of both K orea and Thailand. Interestingly, the estimates also suggest that Thailand and K orea enjoy substantially low errisk premia in the post-crisis period than they experienced prior to the crisis. In fact the risk premia seem to have turned negative overall in both Thailand and K orea, approximately around -4% and -1% respectively.

A ssum ing that the structural innovations are Gaussian, the conditional log-likelihood (ignoring a constant term) is:

$$L_{t} = -1/2 \log |\Gamma_{t}| - 1/2e'_{t} (\Gamma_{t})^{-1}e_{t}$$
(3)

where $\varepsilon_t = (\varepsilon_{1t} \varepsilon_{2t})'$ is the vector of structural innovations. To explicitly recognize the existence of conditional heteroscedasticity we use the following GARCH (1,1) specification for the conditional variance for the i^{th} equation (with i = 1,2):⁶

$$s^{2}_{it} = (I - g_{ii} - g_{2i}) + g_{ii}e^{2}_{it-1} + g_{2i}s^{2}_{it-1}$$

where the constraints $\gamma_{ij} \ge 0$ ensure non-negative conditional variances, and the condition $\gamma_{i1} + \gamma_{i2} < 1$ allows for covariance stationary conditional variances. The constrained intercept term s (see K ing, Sentana, and W adhw ani, 1994, and N orm and in and Phaneuf, 1997) ensure that the unconditional variance of each innovation is unity, and, consequently, that the $\frac{th}{1}$ structural disturbance is hom oscedastic if $\gamma_{i1} = \gamma_{i2} = 0$. The norm alisation to unity of the unconditional variances provides the two additional restrictions necessary to identify the shifts in the slope coefficients.

W e maximize the joint log-likelihood $\Sigma_{t}L_{t}$ over the parameters of the conditional mean and variance equations (A, B(L), δ_{ij} , where i,j = 1,2) by using the simplex algorithm in the first few iterations and then the BFGS algorithm. The Quasi M aximum Likelihood (see Bollersev and W oodlbridge, 1992) estimator was used in order to obtain robust standard errors, given the evidence of non-Gaussian standardized residuals.

⁶ This model specification has been found to be useful to describe the time-varying conditional volatility of many macroeconomic and financial time series (see Bollersev, Chou and Kroner, 1992).

5.Estimation and Empirical Results⁷

The AIC and Schwarz criteria information suggest a VECM (0) for all countries except for Indonesia, for which a VECM (2) was selected. The estimates of the conditional mean and variance equations parameters are presented in Table 1, which only reports the parameters of interest^{β}. As can be seen from Table 1, there is clear evidence of GARCH effects, with the estimated parameters of the conditional variance being significant, which supports the identification scheme proposed in this paper. Furthermore, the sum of the estimated parameters in the conditional variance of the domestic interest rate is less than unity, with the exception of the Philippines⁹. Consequently, for this country we specify an Integrated GARCH (IGARCH) model, by in posing $\gamma_{i1} + \gamma_{i2} = 1$ (where i = 1,2), for the corresponding conditional variance equations.¹⁰ Finally, the diagnostics presented in Table 2 are satisfactory, with the exception of Thailand and Korea, for which some autocorrelation in the standardized residuals is detected by the Ljung-Box statistic. The standard enors (and corresponding tratios) presented in Table 1 for Thailand and Korea are therefore connected for the presence of residual autocorrelation.

The results reported in Table 1 confirm the presence of cointegration, as the error correction coefficient, α_2 , is found to be negative and statistically significant in the estimated interest rate equations. They also suggest that there was a significant monetary policy contraction during turbulent periods, since the sum of the coefficients β_{21} and β_{21D} is negative in all cases, and β_{21D} is highly significant. This confirms that in each of the four countries there was a contemporaneous increase of the dom estic interest rate in response to exchange rate depreciation during the crisis period.

Table 1 also contains clear evidence of a nom inal exchange rate appreciation in response to a dom estic interest rate increase during tranquil periods. This is indicated

 $^{^7}$ The em pirical analysis has been carried using the RATS software.

 $^{^8}$ W $\,$ e do not report the coefficients on the speed of adjustment coefficient in the exchange rate equation, on the lags and the US federal funds rate.

⁹ A spointed out by Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992), the evidence of persistence in the conditional variance is a common finding in much of the empirical literature using financial data.

¹⁰ The presence of IGARCH, as shown by Sentana and Fiorentini (2001), does not affect the identification of the system. In this case, the authors (op. cit.) suggest to restrict the constant part of the

by the coefficient β_{12} , which is found to be positive in all four countries. In contrast, during turbulent periods the nom inal exchange rate appears to depreciate sharply in response to rises in the dom estic policy rate. This is evidenced by the sum of the coefficients β_{12} and β_{12D} , which is clearly negative. Note that β_{12D} is much larger in absolute terms than β_{12} and that it is highly significant in all four cases, suggesting that the effects of monetary policy tightening on the exchange rate during turbulent periods were not only opposite to those during tranquil periods, but also substantially larger.

6. Conclusions

This paper has exam ined the effects of a monetary policy tightening on the exchange rates during the recent A sian crisis. A dvocates of the "revisionist view", such as Stiglitz (1999), in a partial equilibrium model, and Gertler et al. (2000) in a general equilibrium framework, emphasize the perverse effect of an increase in the dom estic interestrates on the dom estic currency, ow ing to a higher probability of bankruptcy of highly leveraged corporations. Our empirical results are consistent with the conventional view in the sense that we find that monetary policy tightening leads to a nom inal exchange rate appreciation during tranquil periods. How ever, they also provide support to the "revisionist" view in that they very clearly show that the tightening of monetary policy that occurred during the A sian financial crisis was excessive. By going beyond what was required to offset increasing risk premia, tighter monetary policy appears to have contributed to the collapse of the exchange rates when they cam e under speculative attack.

Our empirical findings are robust in the sense that we have taken care to address two fundam ental econom etric problems that have plagued the empirical literature on this in portant policy issue. First, we have taken into account the simultaneous feedback between exchange rates and interest rates by specifying a VECM model and by utilising an appropriate identification procedure due to Sentana and Fiorentini (1999), which exploits the presence of heteroscedasticity in the time series under investigation. Second, we have considered a longer time period than other studies, which focus on the crisis period only. This has enabled us to compare the relationship

conditional variance to unity. Furtherm ore, the results do not change if we adopt an IGARCH

between exchange rates and interest rates during tranquil periods with that during more turbulent periods.

specification for the other countries as well.





Figure 2:Korea int.rate and exch.rate



Figure 3: Indonesia int. rate and exch. rate



Figure 4: Philippine int. rate and exch. rate



Table1:Es	stim ation	results
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	Thailand	K orea	Indonesia	Philippines
α ₂	-0.38	-0.14	-0.41	-0.20
	(6.09)	(13.24)	(7.25)	(2.45)
β_{12}	0.10	0.12	0.03	015
	(1.85)	(4.74)	(3 25)	(3.09)
β _{12D}	-4.10	-1.41	-0.34	-0.56
	(1235)	(14.06)	(5.44)	(2.41)
β ₂₁	0.07	0.01	0.04	-0.08
	(2.73)	(2.64)	(1.42)	(1.07)
β_{21D}	-0.11	-0.18	-0.39	-0.34
	(2.94)	(26.33)	(3.48)	(198)
γ ₁₁	0.60	0.71	0 27	0.61
	(6.48)	(6.00)	(5.35)	(15.18)
γ ₁₂	0.36	0.28	0.63	036
	(4.39)	(6.69)	(12,97)	(9.22)
Y ₂₁	0.84	0.48	0.66	0.55
	(20.15)	(14.87)	(7.43)	(9.22)
Y ₂₂	0.13	0.43	0.32	-
	(3.08)	(6.06)	(5.60)	

Note: T-ratios (adjusted for the presence of residual correlation) are in parentheses. In the Philippines, the conditional variance for the interest rate equation has been modelled as an IGARCH, as the sum of γ_{21} and γ_{22} had previously been found to exceed unity.

	Thailand	K orea	Indonesia	Philippines
LB ₁ (10)	0.06	0.01	0.58	034
LB ₂ (10)	0.36	0.33	0،09	039
LB ² 1 (10)	0.61	0.31	010	018
LB ² ₂ (10)	0.80	0.78	80.0	0.77
Ep-Stat ₁	00.0	00.0	00.0	00.0
Ep-Statz	014	0.00	00.0	00.0

Note: The diagnostics are computed for the standardized residuals ε_i (where, i = 1,2). LB is the p-value of the Ljung-Box test for the null of no autocorrelation against the alternative of autocorrelation up to order 20 for the standardized residuals. LB² is same test for the squared standardised residuals. Ep-Stat is the p-value for the norm ality test on the residuals (see Doomik, Hansen, 1994). The subscript i (where, i = 1,2) denotes the i^{th} equation of the VECM.

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