

# Logical Omniscience at the Laboratory\*

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## Abstract

Homo Strategicus populates the vast plains of Game Theory. He knows *all* logical implications of his knowledge (logical omniscience) and chooses optimal strategies given his knowledge and beliefs (rationality). This paper investigates the extent to which the logical capabilities of Homo Sapiens Sapiens resemble those possessed by Homo Strategicus. Controlling for other-regarding preferences and beliefs about the rationality of others, we show, in the laboratory, that the ability of Homo Sapiens Sapiens to perform complex chains of iterative reasoning is much better than previously thought. Subjects were able to perform about two to three iterations of reasoning on average.

**Keywords:** iterative reasoning, depth of reasoning, logical omniscience, rationality, experiments, other-regarding preferences.

**JEL Classification Numbers:** C70, C91.

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
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*The view that machines cannot give rise to surprises is due, I believe, to a fallacy to which philosophers and mathematicians are particularly subject. This is the assumption that as soon as a fact is presented to a mind all consequences of that fact spring into a mind simultaneously with it. It is a very useful assumption under many circumstances, but one too easily forgets that it is false. A natural consequence of doing so is that one then assumes that there is no virtue in the mere working out of consequences from data and general principles.* Alan Turing (1950)

## 1 Introduction

Homo Strategicus populates the vast plains of Game Theory. He is simultaneously rational and logically omniscient, and often assumes that others are too. In this enchanting world, Homo Strategicus knows *all* logical implications of his knowledge (logical omniscience) and chooses optimal strategies given his knowledge and beliefs (rationality). He is also frequently encountered in the wider landscape of Economic Theory. While Homo Strategicus is a useful abstraction comparable to the absence of friction in physics, we – Homo Sapiens Sapiens – seem unable to replicate, or even to approximate, the mighty cognitive abilities of Homo Strategicus. This paper shows, however, that the ability of Homo Sapiens Sapiens to perform complex chains of iterative reasoning is much closer to the prowess of Homo Strategicus than previously thought. More prosaically, the aim of this paper is to experimentally measure the degree of logical omniscience (and rationality) of individuals, controlling for other-regarding preferences and beliefs about the rationality and omniscience of others.

Before proceeding, let us comment on the assumptions of logical omniscience and rationality. Consider the following two-period centipede game:



Suppose that player 1 knows that player 2 is rational and knows player 2's payoffs. The rationality of player 2 implies that he plays *S* if he is given the opportunity to play.

Hence, a *logically omniscient* player 1 knows that if he plays  $C$ , his payoff will be 0, as player 2 then will play  $S$ , while playing  $S$  secures a payoff of 1. A *rational and logically omniscient* player 1 therefore plays  $S$ . Thus, if it is common knowledge that players 1 and 2 are incarnations of Homo Strategicus, it is natural to expect  $(S, S)$  to be the strategy profile which is being played. And, indeed,  $(S, S)$  is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game. More generally, Aumann (1995) has shown that common knowledge of (substantive) rationality implies backward induction in dynamic games of perfect information.<sup>1</sup> Although not explicitly stated in Aumann’s formulation, common knowledge of logical omniscience is fundamental in reaching this conclusion. To see this, suppose that player 1 is not fully omniscient. He might then fail to infer from his knowledge of player 2’s rationality and payoff that player 2 would play  $S$  if given the opportunity. Nonetheless, he might still be rational, i.e., play an optimal strategy, e.g.,  $C$ , given his beliefs about the play of his opponents. Logical omniscience is conceptually different from rationality. Yet, both logical omniscience and rationality are hardly distinguishable in practice and, consequently, often jointly referred to as “rationality” in the literature.<sup>2</sup>

In an extreme case, the real-world might be entirely populated by Homo Strategicus and yet real-life behavior might deviate from equilibrium predictions. The fact that all individuals involved in strategic interaction are logically omniscient and rational does not guarantee subgame perfection; common knowledge of this fact is required. Additionally, the relevant payoffs of the game have to be known, where the relevant payoffs are not necessarily identical to the material payoffs and may include *psychological* components.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, all experimental attempts to measure the level of logical omniscience and rationality in humans by analyzing behavior in strategic games require some auxiliary hypotheses on subjects’ per-

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<sup>1</sup>Aumann (1995) distinguishes between “substantive” and “material” rationality. Substantive rationality stipulates that a player would act rationally at every decision node, even if this player knows that some of his decision nodes won’t be reached. In contrast, material rationality stipulates that a player would act rationally only at the decision nodes he knows to be reached. In general, common knowledge of “material” rationality does not imply backward induction.

<sup>2</sup>Framing effects are another pitfall that Homo Strategicus avoids. If two decision problems, although framed differently, are logically equivalent, then logically omniscient individuals do recognize their logical equivalence, and consequently adopt the very same decision in each problem (Lipman (1999)).

<sup>3</sup>To see this, suppose player 1 is logically omniscient and knows that player 2 also is. Furthermore, suppose that player 1 believes that player 2 has a strong preference for social efficiency and prefers the allocation  $(3, 1)$  over  $(0, 2)$ . In this case, “off-equilibrium” strategy  $C$  is chosen. We refer the reader to Battigalli and Dufwenberg (forthcoming) for more examples of dynamic psychological games.

ception of the cognitive abilities and preferences of others. Bounded rationality and other factors (strategic uncertainty, social preferences, overconfidence, etc.) cannot be cleanly separated in such experiments. In this paper, we propose a novel experimental design, which makes it possible to measure the degree of logical omniscience and rationality of individuals without confounding factors.

The experiment we designed is a variant of the Red Hat Puzzle (also known as the Dirty Faces Game), in which we control for other-regarding preferences and beliefs about the rationality of others. In the Red Hat Puzzle (thereafter RHP), a player has to determine her type (hat's color) by the use of iterative reasoning. For this purpose the player can use her knowledge about the types of the other players and the other players' actions. The distribution of types determines how many iteration steps a player has to perform in order to arrive at the correct answer.<sup>4</sup> In its original form (as used by Weber (2001) or Bayer and Chan (2007)), the RHP suffers from the same problems as other interactive games when used to measure the iteration ability in the laboratory. Players have to rely on the iterative abilities of other players and, therefore, not only their own iterative ability matters but also their beliefs about the ability of others, beliefs about beliefs about the ability of others, etc. Social preferences might also play a role. To overcome this problem we do the following: we transform the RHP into an interactive decision problem where every "player" at each move has a unique logically correct answer. In each game, a single human player plays with computer players only.<sup>5</sup> The computer players are programmed to be logically omniscient, i.e. they always choose the logically correct answer. This fact is communicated to the human player. In this setup a human player, who is able to perform the necessary number of iteration steps for a particular puzzle, can fully rely on the other players' logical omniscience. Additionally, we do not have to worry about the influence of social preferences as the human player does not interact with other humans. Although similar to a simple decision problem, our procedure is not: computer-players do interact with the human-subjects in that their "actions" will depend on the action of the human subjects, and reciprocally. With this procedure, we can cleanly isolate and measure the iteration ability of humans in an interactive situation by varying the type distribution within a subject.

Our experiment highlights two interesting patterns. Firstly, subjects were able to per-

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<sup>4</sup>A detailed description of the puzzle will be given below.

<sup>5</sup>For others experimental designs with automated opponents, see Johnson et al. (2002) and McKinney and Van Huyck (2007).

form about two to three steps of iterative reasoning on average, more than the one to two steps typically measured in games without control for beliefs about the rationality of others. This result masks a more subtle pattern, however. Subjects solving puzzles requiring three iterations were also able to solve puzzles requiring more iterations, while many other subjects failed at puzzles requiring two iterations and, consequently, were not able to solve the puzzles requiring more steps. In other words: The ability to solve puzzles requiring one or two steps of iteration does not predict the ability of solving puzzles requiring three or four steps, while solving puzzles requiring three steps does. Our experiment thus suggests what one could call the slippery slope of logical omniscience. A second result refers to learning: to our surprise, subjects did not only learn from observation (feedback). Introspection alone was sufficient for subjects to perform better when playing the same puzzles for a second time.<sup>6</sup> Our econometric analysis is organized around these two themes (Section 4).

This paper contributes to the large literature on iterative reasoning in games e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), Beard and Beil (1994), Nagel (1995), Ho, Camerer and Weigelt (1998), Goeree and Holt (2001), Van Huck, Wildenthal and Battalio (2002), Cabrera, Capra and Gómez (2006), to name just a few.<sup>7</sup> A recurring feature of many of these studies is the use of games solvable by iterated deletion of strictly or weakly dominated strategies.<sup>8</sup> In these studies, the ability of individuals to perform iterative reasoning is associated with their ability to iteratively delete dominated strategies. Centipede games (e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey (1992)) and beauty contest games (introduced to the literature by Nagel (1995)) are two of the most commonly used games in that literature. However, in those games, iterating to the equilibrium might actually not be optimal for a subject. To see this, re-consider the centipede game above. If player 1, the first mover, believes that player 2, the second mover, won't realize that it is optimal to stop at the first stage, then it might be optimal for player 1 to choose the "non-equilibrium" action  $C$  at the first stage. After all, it is optimal for player 1 to stop precisely at the stage before the one where he believes player 2 will stop. Without controlling for beliefs about the rationality and logical omniscience of others, failure to play the equilibrium cannot be interpreted as limited ability to perform iterated reasoning.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, a researcher interested in the ability of humans to perform chains

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<sup>6</sup>A similar observation is made in Weber (2003).

<sup>7</sup>We refer the reader to chapter 5 of Camerer (2003) for a survey of this literature.

<sup>8</sup>Note that the solution concept of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies requires more stringent conditions than common knowledge of rationality (see Brandenburger et al. (2008)).

<sup>9</sup>The same is true for beauty contests where a logically omniscient player chooses the number corre-

of iterative reasoning might underestimate the actual ability of humans when relying on choices in beauty contest or centipede games alone. The same is true, to our knowledge, for all studies of interactive games aiming to measure the iteration abilities of humans.<sup>10</sup>

The studies mentioned above generally conclude that on average individuals behave as if they are able to perform one to two iterations. Given that individuals – due to the nature of the problems discussed – do not necessarily have an incentive to reveal their ability, this conclusion might be too pessimistic.<sup>11</sup>

Another approach consists in postulating auxiliary assumptions on the behavior and beliefs (types) of individuals, and to estimating the type distributions from data collected in experiments (see, among others, Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995), Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), Camerer et al. (2004), or Costa-Gomez and Crawford (2006)). For instance, Stahl and Wilson (1994) postulate the following “behavioral” types. The first type  $L0$  randomizes uniformly among all his strategies. The second type  $L1$  conjectures that his opponent is of type  $L0$  and, consequently, best replies to a uniform distribution over all the actions of his opponents. The third type  $L2$  conjectures that his opponent is of type  $L1$  and, thus, plays a best-reply to an action of his opponent, which is a best-reply to a uniform distribution over his own action. In general, a player of type  $Lk$  plays a best-reply to the best-reply of a type  $L(k - 1)$ .<sup>12</sup> A higher  $k$  is thus associated with more sophisticated reasoning. However, the type of an individual is only an imperfect measure of his ability to perform chains of iterative reasoning. Indeed, a type  $L2$ , for instance, might well be able to perform more sophisticated chains of reasoning, but his conjecture about the play of his opponent implies that he has to perform only a few iterations of reasoning. Observing a type – say  $L2$  – just means that the player can at least perform the few iterations needed for  $L2$ , but may be able to perform

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sponding to one more iteration step than he believes the others are able to perform. Failing to choose the equilibrium number is not necessarily a sign of limited iterative ability.

<sup>10</sup>Gneezy et al. (2007) and Dufwenberg et al. (2008) use a version of the game “Nim” to study if and how humans learn backward induction. Since there players have (weakly) dominant strategies, this zero-sum game can be used to measure the depth of iterative reasoning in humans if one accepts the auxiliary hypothesis that it is common knowledge that nobody deliberately plays weakly dominated strategies.

<sup>11</sup>Considerable cross-game variation also indicates that the inferred ability might not be accurate. See Camerer et al. (2004, Tables 2 and 3).

<sup>12</sup>To control for other-regarding preferences, an “altruistic” type, maximizing the sum of payoffs, is often assumed. However, a wide range of other-regarding preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Charness and Rabin (2002)) are not accounted for.

many more.<sup>13</sup>

These studies using  $k$ -level hierarchies of decision making are very valuable as they provide us with insights on how humans play in games where they need to have models of the rationality and omniscience of others. Recent studies of this kind further improve our understanding of how cognition in specific games takes place by adding more types and either tracking how individuals gather information (Costa-Gomes et al. (2001)) or eliciting beliefs of individuals about the actions of others (Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008)) in matrix games.<sup>14</sup> However, estimating  $k$ -level models involves joint hypotheses and, therefore, cannot directly provide information on the iterative abilities of an individual.

This paper follows yet another route. Our primary question is the following. How closely related is the Homo Sapiens Sapiens to Homo Strategicus with respect to logical omniscience? Or in other words: how many iterations can humans actually do if we remove all strategic uncertainty and control for social preferences? The purpose of this approach is two-fold. First, we want to clarify if humans are actually as limited in their cognitive abilities as previous studies suggest. Second, we want to provide the tools and results that can be used to augment the analysis of cognitive decision making in games by providing a measurement of actual levels of “bounded rationality.” We believe that this is helpful in order to tackle the question of how much deviation from equilibrium behavior can be attributed to strategic uncertainty or social preferences and how much to the lack of logical omniscience.<sup>15</sup>

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the Red Hat puzzle in detail and highlights the difficulties in implementing it in the laboratory. Section 3 describes our design. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to our main results. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 A simple experiment: the Red Hat puzzle

This section presents a simple puzzle, which will be the basis for our experiment. We follow the exposition of Fagin et al. (1995). Consider  $N$  individuals “playing” together. Each of these individuals has either a red hat or a white hat, observes the hat color of others, but

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<sup>13</sup>Camerer et al (2004) consider more sophisticated conjectures: a player of type of  $Lk$  conjectures that his opponent might be of any type  $Lk'$  with  $k' < k$  with strictly positive probability.

<sup>14</sup>Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker’s results are somewhat unsettling, as they find that subjects’ actions are not consistent with their (stated) beliefs about the actions of others.

<sup>15</sup>In a companion paper, Bayer and Renou (2009), we use our measure of logical omniscience along with measures of other-regarding preferences to explain the play of individuals in strategic-form games.

cannot observe the color of his own hat. Suppose that some of the individuals, say  $n > 0$ , have a red hat. Along comes a referee, who declares that “at least one player has a red hat on the head.” The referee then asks the following question: “What is your hat color?” All players then simultaneously choose an answer out of “I can’t possibly know”, “I have a red hat”, or “I have a white hat.” Players then learn the answers of the other players and are asked again what their hat color is. This process is repeated until all players have inferred their hat color. This problem is known as the Red Hat Puzzle.<sup>16</sup>

We can prove that the  $n - 1$  first times the referee asks the question, individuals should answer “I cannot possibly know,” and the  $n$ -th time, individuals with red hats should all answer “I have a red hat.” The proof is by induction on  $n$ .<sup>17</sup> For  $n = 1$ , the single individual with a red hat sees that no one else has a red hat. Since it is commonly known that there is at least one red hat, he must conclude that he is the one. Now suppose that  $n = 2$ , i.e., there are two individuals (say 1 and 2) with a red hat. Both should answer “I cannot possibly know” the first time the question is asked, as both see another red hat. The information that there is at least one red hat does not help. However, when individual 2 says “I cannot possibly know,” individual 1 realizes that he must have a red hat. For otherwise, individual 2 would have known that he has a red hat right away and should have answered “I have a red hat” the first time the question was asked. Thus, individual 1 can infer wearing a red hat and should answer “I have a red hat” the second time the question is asked (after observing 2’s answer, of course). Similarly, individual 2 must conclude that he has a red hat.

In the next round the other players can infer that they must have white hats. The fact that the two players with red hats were able to figure out that they are wearing red hats after observing one round of answers (by the logic above) implies that both of them can only have seen one red hat each. The remaining players can infer that their hat cannot be red, as they now know that there are two red hats in total and they see these two red hats on the heads of others. They answer: “I have a white hat.” This logic naturally extends to situations with  $n = 3, 4, \dots, N$ . The greater the number of red hats an individual observes, the more complex is the reasoning needed to logically infer the color of one’s own hat. An individual needs  $m + 1$  iteration steps to figure out his hat color, where  $m$  denotes the number of red

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<sup>16</sup>The same game is also known as the “Dirty Faces Game.” For an alternative exposition see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).

<sup>17</sup>Equivalently, we can show that an individual correctly infers the color of his hat (red or white) after  $m + 1$  iterations (questions) if he observes  $m$  red hats.

hats this individual sees.

It is important to note that the above logic for a player correctly inferring his hat color does not rely on the assumption of logical omniscience alone. The remainder of this section examines the additional assumptions necessary and discusses the difficulties arising with respect to experimental implementation.

Firstly, the logic above rests on the assumption of common knowledge of logical omniscience. Even if an individual is logically omniscient, he also needs to know that the answers of the other individuals are logically correct. To see this, suppose that there is a unique red hat and individual 1 observes this red hat. Individual 1 can only correctly infer his hat color (white) if the player, who wears the red hat, answers the first question accurately with “I have a red hat”. It follows that any experimental design using the red-hat puzzle to measure the human ability of performing iterated chains of reasoning has to make sure that each individual knows that the answers of other players are logically correct. Otherwise, it would not be possible to separate the effects of subjects’ cognitive limitations from those caused by their beliefs about the cognitive abilities of others.

Secondly, the event “There is at least one red hat” must also be common knowledge, otherwise individuals are not able to infer their hat color. To see this, suppose that there is only one red hat. The individual with the red hat observes three white hats, but clearly cannot infer the color of his hat if he does not know that there is at least one red hat. Moreover, even if he knows that there is at least one red hat, the individuals with the white hats cannot infer their hat color if they do not know that the individual with the red hat knows that there is at least one red hat, etc. Our experimental design has therefore to ensure that the event “There is at least one red hat” is common knowledge.

Thirdly, individuals must have incentives to correctly infer their hat color and to truthfully report their logical inferences (even at intermediate steps). Moreover, since an individual’s answer influences the subsequent answers of others and, therefore, their payoffs, an individual might want to manipulate his answers to affect the payoff of others if he has other-regarding preferences. Our experimental design will need to properly incentivize individuals and to exclude any confounding influences from social preferences.

As already argued in the introduction, previous experiments measuring the ability of individuals to perform chains of iterative reasoning have typically used games solvable by iterated deletion of strictly or weakly dominated strategies (see Camerer (2003), chapter 5). The failure to control for common knowledge in logical omniscience and rationality and

social preferences casts a shadow of doubt on previous results. An individual might well be a perfect incarnation of Homo Strategicus, and yet fail to play “equilibrium” actions. A doubt about the omniscience and rationality of others is enough to derail the process of iterated deletion of dominated strategies.

### 3 Experimental protocol and treatments

This section describes our experimental protocol, and how it addresses the difficulties discussed in the previous section.

In our experiment, a human subject was paired with three computers, which were acting as “players.” Pairing an individual with computers has several advantages given our objective. Firstly, we can reasonably assume that individuals have no concerns for the eventual “payoffs” of computers. Secondly, we can ensure that a subject knows that the computers’ answers are logically correct by a) programming the computer-players to choose the logically correct answers and b) communicating this credibly to the subject. Accordingly, computers were programmed to choose the logically correct answers at each round of questions (see below), and the instructions emphasized this point heavily.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, subjects were told (and constantly reminded with an on-screen message) that there was at least one red hat.

Subjects were asked to infer their hat color from the information given to them. At any point when they were asked, they had three possible answers to choose from: “I have a WHITE hat with certainty,” “I have a RED hat with certainty,” and “I cannot possibly know.” The first time a subject had to choose an answer within a puzzle the information a subject had was the hat color of the three computer-players (along with the fact that there was at least one red hat). In any subsequent round within the puzzle, the information a subject had was the complete history of all answers of all players (the computers’ and his) in all previous rounds. Similarly, the initial information a computer-player had was the hat color of the two other computers and the human-subject and, subsequently, the complete history of answers. The computers’ answers at each point where they were asked was the (unique) logically correct answer inferred from their information and history (assuming that the human player was logically omniscient). Before subjects started the experiment, they had to answer some control questions testing their understanding of the instructions and

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<sup>18</sup>Instructions are available at <http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/lr78/>.

screen layout (see Figure 5 in the Appendix).

A RHP was stopped after either a wrong answer by the human or a correct announcement of the hat color.<sup>19</sup> This stopping procedure is necessary to avoid logical inconsistencies. Suppose there is only one red hat, which is worn by the human subject. The subject initially observes three white hats. Now, if the subject (wrongly) answers “I cannot possibly know,” then computers should logically infer and, if allowed, answer “I have a red hat.” However, this contradicts what the subject observes. Although the computers in this case would chose the logically correct answer, we would have lost control over how a subject interprets this inconsistency. We believe that the observation of contradicting computer announcements and physical reality would have led subjects to believe that the computers were not properly programmed or that our claim that the computers are logically omniscient was based on deception. Stopping a RHP puzzle early does not have any negative consequences for our ability to measure the performance of subjects, as observing the stage where a subject makes the first mistake in a puzzle contains all the information needed.

Since each individual was paired with three computers, we had seven possible distinct logical situations. A logical situation was determined by the number of red hats a subject saw and whether the subject had a red or white hat herself. The more red hats a subject was observing, the more steps (iterations) were required to correctly infer the hat color. We took full advantage of these seven situations to measure the degree of logical omniscience and rationality of individuals.

**Treatments.** Our experiment consists of six treatments. The treatments differ by the number and order of puzzles presented to the subject, as well as by the feedback given. Puzzles could be ordered in *increasing order of complexity* (i.e. the number of red hats a subject observed was weakly increasing from one puzzle to the next), or the ordering of the puzzles could be random. In some treatments subjects got feedback on whether they solved the previous puzzle correctly or not. In others they did not receive any feedback about previous success or failure. The idea behind varying feedback and order was two-fold. Firstly, this allows us to conduct robustness checks on our measure of logical omniscience. Secondly, we can gain an insight into the conditions under which subjects are able to learn to perform more complicated chains of reasoning.

In treatments I-IV, subjects were asked to play two series of the seven situations presented

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<sup>19</sup>At a given round, announcing a hat color was correct only if it was actually possible to infer the hat color at this given round.

above. In treatment I, the seven situations were ordered in increasing order of complexity and feedback was provided after each round. In treatment II, the seven situations were also ordered in increasing order of complexity, but no feedback was provided. In treatment III, the seven situations were randomly ordered and feedback was provided. In treatment IV, the seven situations were randomly ordered and no feedback was provided. In treatment V (the one-shot treatment), subjects were asked to play one and only one situation, chosen at random among the seven possible situations. The random draws were independent across subjects. The objective of this additional treatment was to control for pattern recognition and learning within a sequence of the seven situations. Lastly, in treatment VI, subjects were asked to play the seven situations in increasing order of complexity (without feedback) and also several strategic-form games.<sup>20</sup> For convenience, Table 1 summarizes our treatments along with the number of subjects who participated in each treatment.

<b>Treatment</b>	<b><i>N</i></b>	<b>Sequence 1</b>	<b>Sequence 2</b>
I	23	7 RHP ordered, feedback	7 RHP ordered, feedback
II	22	7 RHP ordered, no feedback	7 RHP ordered, no feedback
III	20	7 RHP random, feedback	7 RHP random, feedback
IV	25	7 RHP random, no feedback	7 RHP random, no feedback
V	129	1 (random) RHP	–
VI	30	7 RHP ordered, no feedback	unrelated games

**Table 1:** Treatments

**Payments.** Inferring the color of one’s hat requires substantial (cognitive) effort. Incentives have therefore to be “powerful” enough for individuals to exert the necessary effort. To provide such powerful incentives, we followed Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) idea that individuals are more sensitive to losses than gains. In all treatments where one or two complete sets of the seven situations were played, subjects started with a lump sum of AU\$ 35 (AU\$ 17.50 if they were playing only seven situations), and lost AU\$ 2.50 for each wrong

<sup>20</sup>This treatment was initially used as a pilot for the companion paper. For the present paper, we have pooled the data on the seven situations of the RHP subjects played in treatment VI with the data of treatments I-IV. We conducted our econometric analysis with and without treatment VI and did not find substantial differences. The data from Treatment VI add to the statistical power of our tests.

answer. In treatment V, we used a lottery system, where five winners of substantial prizes (AU\$ 300 each) were drawn from the pool of subjects who correctly solved their puzzle. The average payment was AU\$ 24.89 for treatment I, AU\$ 19.54 for treatment II, AU\$ 21.12 for treatment III, AU\$ 23.3 for treatment IV, AU\$ 11.62 for treatment V, and AU\$ 8.33 for treatment VI.<sup>21</sup>

The experiments took place at AdLab, the Adelaide Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the University of Adelaide in Australia. Treatments I-IV took place on 28 August 2005, treatment V took place on 08 June 2006 (two consecutive sessions in parallel labs), and treatment VI on 05 June 2007. The spreading of the sessions and the parallel session were designed to prevent information leakage within the subject pool, as solutions to the RHP can be found on the internet. We used Urs Fischbacher’s (2007) experimental software Z-tree. The 249 participants were mostly students from the University of Adelaide and the University of South Australia. Table 2 gives a breakdown of the main characteristics of the participants (for the whole sample). There are no substantial differences in characteristics across treatments. The variable “high school maths” measures whether a subject attended advanced mathematics courses at A-level (or equivalent).

Before proceeding, let us reflect on some possible predictions. Firstly, we can naturally expect that the more iterations required to solve a given puzzle, the lower the likelihood that such a puzzle is correctly solved. Secondly, our experiment can shed light on the ability of individuals to learn how to perform more iterations of reasoning. Individuals can learn from both observation and introspection. Treatments II and IV, for which no feedback is provided, might highlight the extent to which individuals learn from introspection.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, treatments I and II, for which the puzzles were presented in increasing order of complexity, might induce more learning from introspection. Indeed, to solve a puzzle requiring  $m$  iterations of reasoning requires the ability to solve puzzles requiring  $m' < m$  iterations (by induction). Overall, we might therefore expect that the likelihood of correctly solving a puzzle is the highest in treatment I, where both sources of learning are in operation, and the lowest (out of these four treatments) in treatment IV. Treatment V (one-shot) can be used

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<sup>21</sup>In treatment VI, subjects were also paid a show-up fee and the payoff received in one of the strategic-form games chosen at random.

<sup>22</sup>Note, however, that even in treatments with no feedback, some partial inference was possible. Whenever the game was stopping following the answer “I can’t possibly know,” a subject might have inferred that he must have known his hat color. We return to this point later on.

<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Proportion in sample</b>
<i>Gender</i>	
male	65.8%
female	34.2%
<i>Courses</i>	
arts	3.6%
commerce/finance	38.7%
economics	4.4%
engineering	34.4%
law	2.4%
medicine	8.7%
science	5.5%
other	2.3%
<i>High school maths</i>	76.1%
<i>Age</i>	
16-25	91.10%
25-30	6%
31-40	1.1%
> 41	1.8%

**Table 2:** Demographic characteristics in the sample

(by comparing the success rate to that in the other treatments) to identify learning within a sequence of RHPs. There no learning is possible. Lastly, we can reasonably conjecture that almost all individuals can infer that they have a red hat, when initially they do not observe a red hat (since they were told that there is at least one red hat). Consequently, correctly solving a puzzle requiring two iterations should have limited predictive power on the ability to solve puzzles requiring three or four iterations.<sup>23</sup> However, correctly solving a puzzle requiring three iterations should be a better predictor of the ability to perform four iterations.

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<sup>23</sup>Since solving a puzzle requiring two iterations requires to solve the puzzle requiring one iteration, an extremely easy task.

## 4 Empirical results

In this section, we first present empirical regularities regarding the likelihood of subjects correctly inferring their hat color across treatments. We show that the empirical frequency of correctly solved puzzles is relatively high in all treatments, and certainly much higher than we expected.<sup>24</sup> We will also show that in treatments I-IV, the empirical frequency is much higher in the second series of seven puzzles than in the first series, and much higher than in treatment V. This strongly suggests that individuals did learn from introspection and observation. Furthermore, we will see that the likelihood of solving a puzzle requiring three and four iterations are about the same, which suggests that individuals able to solve a puzzle requiring three iterations can also solve puzzles requiring four iterations. Later, we report the results of our econometric analysis, which confirms the above empirical regularities and uncovers some other interesting regularities.

### 4.1 Data analysis


We first report the percentage of individuals over the entire sample who correctly perform  $m'$  ( $m' = 0, \dots, m + 1$ ) iterations (steps) of reasoning when  $(m + 1)$  iterations are needed to correctly infer one's hat color (see Figure 1). For instance, in the second panel of Figure 1, individuals needed to perform two iterations of reasoning to correctly infer their hat color. About 8.83% of the answers were incorrect at the first iteration (i.e., performed zero steps out of the two steps needed), 18.01% incorrect at the second iteration (i.e., performed one step) and 73.16% were correct (i.e., performed two steps). Furthermore, in each panel, the bar furthest to the right represents the percentage of individuals who correctly solved a puzzle (as a function of the number of steps needed to solve it). If one step was needed, 99.27% of the answers were correct, 73.16% if two steps were needed, 43.41% if three steps were needed and 39.96% if four steps were needed.<sup>25</sup>

Several observations are worth mentioning. Firstly, as expected, the more iterations are required to correctly infer one's hat color, the lower is the percentage of correct answers. Secondly, and somewhat surprisingly, there is almost no difference between solving a puzzle requiring three iterations and one requiring four iterations (43.41% vs. 39.96%), while there

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<sup>24</sup>We actually had to run to the bank during the first sessions (28/08/2005) to get more cash!

<sup>25</sup>Conditioning on the individuals who correctly answered our control questions, the percentages become 100%, 77.03%, 46.45% and 44.84%, respectively.



**Figure 1:** Frequency of correct answers

is a significant difference between solving a puzzle requiring two iterations and one requiring three or four. The pairwise correlations reported in Table 3, reinforce this observation. The within-subject correlation between the number of correct answers when two and three steps are required is about the same as the within-subject correlation between the number of correct answers when two and four steps are required (0.423 vs. 0.425), while the correlation between the number of correct answers when three and four steps are required is significantly higher at 0.641.<sup>26</sup> This observation suggests that individuals slide down the *the slippery slope of logical omniscience*: if an individual can do three steps of iterative reasoning, then she can do four steps. Our econometric analysis will confirm this empirical observation.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup>Testing for the equality of the correlation coefficients between two and three steps and two and four steps, we do not reject the null hypothesis, while we do reject the null hypothesis that correlation coefficients between two and three steps (or two and four steps) and three and four steps are the same.

<sup>27</sup>The probability  $\Pr(m|m')$  to correctly solve a puzzle requiring  $m$  iterations conditional on having correctly solved all puzzles requiring up to  $m' < m$  iterations are:  $\Pr(2|1) = .78$ ,  $\Pr(3|1) = .46$ ,  $\Pr(4|1) = .42$ ,  $\Pr(3|2) = .58$ ,  $\Pr(4|2) = .54$ , and  $\Pr(4|3) = .8$ . Again, we have that the probability  $\Pr(3|2)$  of solving a puzzle requiring three iterations conditional on having solved the puzzles requiring two iterations or less is not statistically different from the probability  $\Pr(4|2)$  of solving a puzzle requiring four iterations conditional

	# correct 1 step	# correct 2 steps	# correct 3 steps	# correct 4 steps
# correct 1 step	1.000			
# correct 2 steps	0.058	1.000		
# correct 3 steps	0.048	0.423***	1.000	
# correct 4 steps	-0.016	0.425***	0.641***	1.000

**Table 3:** Correlation table for the number of puzzles correctly solved.

Thirdly, the mode of each empirical distribution in Figure 1 is the *critical iteration*, that is, the mass is concentrated on the  $m$ -th or  $(m + 1)$ -th iteration if  $(m + 1)$  are required ( $m = 0, \dots, 3$ ). Note that up to the  $m$ -th decision, the correct answer is “I can’t possibly know.” Many subjects might have chosen this correct answer for the wrong reason. A subject might simply fail to grasp the logical implications of his knowledge and, consequently, choose to answer “I can’t possibly know” because of his confusion. Intermediate steps might therefore reflect very biased information about the logical omniscience of individuals. For this reason, we will ignore intermediate steps for most of our econometric analysis. Robustness checks, however, will be performed.


Figure 2 presents the percentage of puzzles correctly solved as a function of the number of iterations required to solve them and whether individuals have played them in isolation (treatment V), for the first (1st seq.) or second time (2nd seq.) in the treatments with repetition (treatments I-IV). A striking pattern emerges: individuals do seem to learn from both introspection and observation. Indeed, if we compare individuals playing a puzzle of a certain complexity in isolation (treatment V) with individuals playing the same situation for the first time in treatments I-IV, the likelihood of solving the puzzle is much higher in the latter treatments. Moreover, the likelihood of individuals correctly solving the same puzzle the second time round is even higher.<sup>28</sup> And this is true in all situations. Furthermore, the

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on having solved the puzzles requiring two iterations or less. However, they are statistically different from the the probability  $\Pr(4|3)$  of solving a puzzle requiring 4 iterations conditional on having solved the puzzles requiring 3 iterations or less.

<sup>28</sup>Over the entire sample, there are only four observations of an individual correctly solving a puzzle for the first time and failing the second time. Surprisingly, the four observations are in treatments I and III, the treatments with feedback.

same pattern emerges if we look at treatments II and IV, where individuals did not receive feedback i.e., without any additional information (See Figure 3). In that case, learning can only come from introspection.




**Figure 2:** Correct answers by steps necessary and repetition

As already mentioned, in treatments II and IV with no feedback, some inference was possible when the game was stopping after the announcement “I cannot possibly know.” An individual might have inferred that he should have known his hat’s color. The inference is by introspection, however. In treatments II and IV, there are, respectively, 9 and 10 observations of an individual incorrectly answering “I cannot possibly know” the first time he plays a puzzle and correctly solving the puzzle the second time, while the number of observations of an individual incorrectly answering “I cannot possibly know” the first time he plays a puzzle is 21 and 19, respectively. In comparison, in treatments I and III with feedback, the respective numbers of observations are 6 out of 12 and 6 out of 10. The likelihood to correctly infer one hat’s color the second time round conditional on incorrectly answering “I cannot possibly” the first time is .5 in treatment I, .43 in treatment II, .6 in treatment III and .53 in treatment IV. This indicates that subjects did made similar

inferences in treatments with feedback and without feedback when the game was stopping after the announcement “I cannot possibly know.”

We can contrast these numbers with the numbers of observations of individuals incorrectly stating their hats’ color the first time they play a puzzle and correctly solving the puzzle the second time. In treatments II and IV with no feedback, the numbers are 8 out of 30 and 2 out of 19, respectively.<sup>29</sup> In comparison, in treatments I and III with feedback, the respective numbers of observations are 9 out of 20 and 5 out of 22. We can note that the likelihood to correctly infer one hat’s color the second time round conditional on incorrectly stating one hat’s color the first time is about twice higher in treatment I with respect to treatment II (.45 vs .26) and in treatment III with respect to treatment IV (.22 vs .10). This suggests that feedback is an important source of learning, but not the only one.



**Figure 3:** Correct answers by steps necessary, repetition, and feedback

<sup>29</sup>The second number is the number of observations of individual incorrectly stating their hats’ color the first time they play a puzzle.

## 4.2 Econometric analysis

We first consider the determinants of correctly inferring one’s hat color. The dependent variable is “correct,” a dichotomous variable indicating whether a subject had correctly inferred his hat color in a given situation. We estimated four different econometric models: a probit and a logit model allowing for error clustering within subjects, and a probit and logit model allowing for random intercepts for individuals (i.e., panel models with subject-specific random effects). The random effects are assumed to be normally distributed. We report these four regressions to assess the robustness of our analysis. We ran logit and probit models to test whether our results are robust to the specifications of the response probability. The naturally preferred econometric models are the panel models (we have observations for the same individual over time). However, the panel specification might suffer from biases due to the unbalanced panel structure. We either observe an individual’s answer(s) in one puzzle (treatment V), seven puzzles (treatment VI) or fourteen puzzles (treatments I-IV).<sup>30</sup> We therefore report the results from cross-sectional regressions with error clustering (pooled probit and logit) as a further robustness check. We used treatment II (the ordered, no feedback treatment) as the reference group for the treatment dummies. Table 4 reports the marginal effects averaged over the whole sample.

**Table 4:** Determinants of correct choices in the Red-Hat Puzzle

	Probit	Logit	Panel Probit	Panel Logit
<b>Avg. marg effects</b>	<b>Dependent variable:</b> <i>correct</i> (situation correctly solved)			
<i>Iteration step dummies (1 step is the reference in all regressions)</i>				
<i>2 steps needed</i>	−0.312*** (0.040)	−0.323*** (0.045)	−0.300*** (0.032)	−0.298*** (0.036)
<i>3 steps needed</i>	−0.547*** (0.042)	−0.555*** (0.053)	−0.574*** (0.039)	−0.579*** (0.049)
<i>4 steps needed</i>	−0.587*** (0.042)	−0.590*** (0.052)	−0.618*** (0.037)	−0.622*** (0.047)
<i>Treatment dummies (ordered, no feedback is the reference)</i>				
<i>ordered, feedback</i>	0.173*** (0.051)	0.175*** (0.051)	0.192*** (0.060)	0.192*** (0.063)

<sup>30</sup>We did the econometric analysis with treatments I-IV only and did not find qualitative differences.

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**Table 4:** ... continued

	Probit	Logit	Panel Probit	Panel Logit
<i>random, feedback</i>	0.092 (0.057)	0.093 (0.057)	0.087 (0.070)	0.087 (0.073)
<i>random, no feedback</i>	0.081 (0.059)	0.084 (0.058)	0.067 (0.065)	0.062 (0.069)
<i>one shot</i>	-0.071 (0.049)	-0.075 (0.050)	-0.092 (0.060)	-0.103 (0.062)
<hr/> <i>Degree dummies (economics is the reference group)</i>				
<i>engineering</i>	0.165** (0.079)	0.153* (0.080)	0.116 (0.103)	0.113 (0.108)
<i>medicine</i>	0.218*** (0.079)	0.201*** (0.080)	0.178* (0.108)	0.173 (0.107)
Other degrees (arts, commerce, finance, science, law) not significant				
<i>gender (male=1)</i>	0.139*** (0.040)	0.142*** (0.040)	0.171*** (0.048)	0.179*** (0.051)
<i>control questions OK</i>	0.080 (0.056)	0.079 (0.057)	0.133** (0.058)	0.144** (0.061)
<i>repetition</i>	0.098*** (0.023)	0.093*** (0.024)	0.157*** (0.025)	0.153*** (0.025)
<i>time first choice</i>	-0.0032*** (0.00081)	-0.0036*** (0.00086)	-0.0001 (0.00020)	-0.0001 (0.00020)
<hr/> Dummies for age, advanced math, critical time, all not significant				
<i>N</i>	1599	1599	1599	1599
<i>ρ</i>	—	—	0.504***	0.517***
Log-likelihood	-745.15	-743.55	-636.97	-630.78
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; $Prob < \chi^2 < 0.0001$ (all models)				

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We organize our econometric analysis around two main themes: iterative reasoning and learning.

***Iterative reasoning.*** All our regressions confirm our initial observation: the more steps

required to solve a puzzle, the less likely it is that an individual solves it ( $p < 0.01$ , Wald tests in all applicable models). For instance, with the Panel Probit model, the probability of solving a puzzle requiring two steps is 0.3 lower than that for the puzzle requiring one step (the reference). The probability difference to the one-step puzzle is even lower if three or four steps are required (lower by 0.574 and 0.618, respectively). Moreover, the likelihood of correctly inferring one’s hat color when two steps are required is about twice as high as that for solving a puzzle requiring four steps. This is true for all econometric models. However, the likelihood does not differ much between three and four steps (e.g.,  $-0.574$  vs.  $-0.618$  in the Panel Probit model). This suggests that individuals who are able to perform three steps are also able to perform four steps: the slippery slope of logical omniscience. To reinforce our point, we tested whether solving a puzzle requiring three steps was statistically different from solving one requiring four steps and could not reject the null hypothesis that they are equal in any of our four models.<sup>31</sup> In contrast, we reject the null hypothesis that solving a puzzle requiring two steps is equivalent to one requiring three or four steps in all models ( $p < 0.01$ , Wald tests).

Two closely related experimental studies are Weber (2001) and Bayer and Chan (2009). Weber implements the red hat puzzle as a dynamic game of incomplete information between two or three human players. Bayer and Chan replicate Weber’s experiment and compare the replication with a modified version of Weber’s game, where equilibria in weakly dominated strategies are eliminated.<sup>32</sup> As already argued, deviation from equilibrium play cannot be used to directly estimate the ability of players to do iterative reasoning in those games. Auxiliary assumptions such as common knowledge of rationality, common belief in conjectures or common knowledge of the payoffs (possibly included other-regarding concerns), are required. By contrast, in our study, the only cause for subjects deviating from the “equilibrium” (i.e., the optimal sequence of choices in our decision problem) are their own inability to reason.

Consequently, comparisons between these studies and our study are difficult. The most severe problem is related to the fact that in the interactive version of the red hat puzzle, a premature end of the game is possible. All players can end the game at each stage by playing the action “down,” which is equivalent to choosing the statement “I have a red hat” in our setting. Whenever a player erroneously (i.e., deviating from the equilibrium path) chooses

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<sup>31</sup>Wald test in all models. The lowest  $p$ -value is 0.1725 obtained in the Panel Probit model.

<sup>32</sup>In Weber’s design, a player correctly inferring his hat’s color at stage  $t$  was indifferent between revealing his hat color at stage  $t$  or at stage  $t + 1$ .

this action, the game ends prematurely. Therefore, it is impossible to assess whether the other players would have played according to the equilibrium strategies in later stages. There are two reasonable ways of dealing with this problem. Weber implicitly assumes that players, who had followed the equilibrium path up to the stage where the game ended prematurely, would have continued on the equilibrium path in later stages. This overestimates equilibrium agreement. This bias is likely to be large, especially if we consider our findings (see Figure 1) that the last choice a subject has to make is the critical choice and most mistakes are made at this stage.

A second approach (Bayer and Chan) is to drop all individual observations, where other players prematurely ended the game. Results based on this second approach are better suited for comparison with the results of our study, as in our experiment the other players (the computers) never prematurely end the game. Using this approach, Bayer and Chan report agreement rates with sequential equilibrium for their three player red-hat game of 86.7 percent when one step of iteration is needed, 10.6 percent when two steps are needed, and 5.3 percent when three steps are needed. In their modified version of the game, the agreement is higher (91.7 percent when one step is needed, 39.7 percent when two are and 19.1 percent when three steps are). The success rates in our experiment are thus much higher than in these studies (see above). This suggests that a high proportion of the deviations from “equilibrium behavior” observed in the studies of Weber (2001) and Bayer and Chan (2009) might have resulted from players’ doubts about the rationality of others and not from their own limited ability.

To assess the robustness of our results, we replicated our econometric analysis treatment-by-treatment. For treatments II and IV (i.e., the treatments with feedback), signs, coefficient magnitudes and significance levels of the marginal effects are very similar to the results obtained for the whole sample. For instance, in treatment II, the likelihood of correctly inferring one’s hat color is 0.282, 0.568 and 0.611 lower when comparing two, three and four-step puzzles with the easiest one-step RHP (Panel Probit). Furthermore, as with the aggregate results, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that solving a puzzle requiring three steps is equivalent to solving one requiring four steps, while we can reject the null hypothesis for the comparison between two and three steps and between two and four steps.

For treatments I and III we had to exclude all the observations related to the puzzle requiring one iteration. In treatments I and III all subjects correctly inferred their hat color

when one step was required, creating a problem of hidden collinearity.<sup>33</sup> Excluding these observations and the dummy variable for “1 step needed” we again obtain the result that solving a puzzle requiring three steps is statistically equivalent to solving a puzzle requiring four steps, and different from solving a puzzle requiring two steps (the reference step). However, we can note a difference between treatment I (ordered-feedback) and treatment III (random-feedback). For treatment I, the likelihood of solving a puzzle requiring three and four steps is 0.110 and 0.162 lower than for a puzzle requiring two steps, while it is respectively lower by 0.404 and 0.480 for treatment III. In treatment I, solving a puzzle requiring three steps was only marginally more difficult than solving one requiring two steps. This result should be not too disturbing since in treatment I puzzles requiring two iterations were played first, and feedback was provided (both sources of learning were operating). Overall, our results are extremely robust.

***Learning: feedback and introspection.*** Table 4 offers two preliminary observations. Firstly, subjects in treatment I (ordered and feedback) did perform better than subjects in the reference group (ordered and no feedback); their likelihood of correctly solving a puzzle is higher by at least 0.17 ( $p < 0.01$ , Wald test in all models). In contrast, subjects in the three other treatments did not perform (statistically) better (coefficients not significant in all models). Although not significant, subjects in treatment V (one-shot) performed worse than the reference group. These results seem to suggest that unless an individual benefits from both sources of learning, i.e., introspection and observation, the likelihood to correctly solve a puzzle is not affected by learning (no treatment effects). Further econometric analysis (Table 5) will, however, show that this suggestion is not completely accurate. Secondly, repetition increases the likelihood of correctly solving a puzzle, with an effect ranging from 0.093 in the Logit model to 0.157 in the Panel Probit model.

To get a deeper understanding of the magnitudes of learning within and across treatments, we ran two additional regressions – a Panel Probit model and a Panel Logit model. In these regressions, we introduced dummies for treatments and repetition e.g., the dummy “ordered, feedback, seq. 1” refers to the first sequence of seven puzzles of treatment I. We used treatment V (the one-shot treatment) as the reference base. These two additional regressions complement our previous regressions in two main respects. Firstly, we decomposed

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<sup>33</sup>More precisely, the covariate pattern “(1 step =1, 2 steps= 3 steps = 4 steps = 0)” only has 1 as its outcome. Dropping these observations, there is a collinearity problem. For an explanation of hidden collinearity, we refer the reader to <http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/logitcd.html>.

the marginal effects of a treatment into the marginal effects of a treatment conditional on whether the first or second sequence of puzzles was played. Due to the very definition of marginal effects, it is not possible to recover the overall treatment effects from the decomposed treatment effects. Secondly, we have changed the reference base to treatment V (the one-shot treatment) in order to emphasize the learning effects. Table 5 reports our results (average marginal affects over the whole sample).

**Table 5:** Learning: observation and introspection

Avg. marg effects	Panel Probit	Panel Logit
	Dependent variable: <i>correct</i>	
<i>Iteration step dummies (1 step is the reference in all regressions)</i>		
<i>2 steps needed</i>	-0.300*** (0.032)	-0.299*** (0.036)
<i>3 steps needed</i>	-0.574*** (0.039)	-0.579*** (0.049)
<i>4 steps needed</i>	-0.618*** (0.037)	-0.622*** (0.047)
<hr/>		
<i>Treatment and sequence dummies (one-shot is the reference)</i>		
<i>ordered, feedback, seq. 1</i>	0.250*** (0.052)	0.255*** (0.056)
<i>ordered, feedback, seq. 2</i>	0.356*** (0.035)	0.359*** (0.036)
<i>ordered, no feedback, seq. 1</i>	0.080 (0.056)	0.090 (0.057)
<i>ordered, no feedback, seq. 2</i>	0.243*** (0.051)	0.244*** (0.052)
<i>random, feedback, seq. 1</i>	0.161** (0.066)	0.166** (0.067)
<i>random, feedback, seq. 2</i>	0.288*** (0.049)	0.292*** (0.049)
<i>random, no feedback, seq. 1</i>	0.173*** (0.060)	0.178*** (0.062)

**Table 5:** ... continued

	Panel Probit	Panel Logit
<i>random, no feedback, seq. 2</i>	0.252*** (0.053)	0.253*** (0.054)
<i>Degree dummies (economics is the reference)</i>		
<i>medicine</i>	0.179* (0.108)	0.174 (0.113)
Other degrees not significant		
<i>gender (male=1)</i>	0.170*** (0.047)	0.179*** (0.050)
<i>control questions OK</i>	0.134** (0.058)	0.145** (0.061)
All other dummies for ages and decision times, all not significant		
<i>N</i>	1599	1599
<i>ρ</i>	0.505***	0.517***
Log-likelihood	-635.55	-629.37
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1;		
<i>Prob &lt; χ² &lt; 0.0001 (all models)</i>		

As an initial observation, note that the estimates for the number of steps needed are consistent with our previous findings in Table 4. Focusing now on the dummies capturing the learning effects, we can note that all dummies are positive compared to the reference group (the one-shot treatment) and significant at the 5% level at least, with the notable exception of the first sequence of treatment II. There is therefore strong evidence that subjects do learn from feedback and introspection. Moreover, there is even learning within the first sequence of all treatments but treatment II, which corroborates even further our hypothesis of learning from introspection. Experience (repetition) also improves the performance. In any treatment I to IV, the coefficient for the second sequence is higher than the coefficient for the first sequence (e.g., 0.250 vs 0.356 for treatment I in the Panel Probit model). Statistical one-sided tests confirm this observation.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup>We tested for the null hypothesis “in treatment  $i$ , the coefficient for sequence 1 = coefficient for sequence 2” vs. “in treatment  $i$ , the coefficient for sequence 1 < coefficient for sequence 2.”

We also tested for the magnitude of learning between the two sequences of play across treatments. More precisely, we tested whether the increase in the likelihood to correctly solve a given puzzle between the first sequence and the second sequence was the same in treatment  $i$  and treatment  $j$ . With two-sided tests, we found no statistical differences in all treatments but one. The exception is again treatment I (ordered-feedback), which differs from treatment IV (random-no feedback) at the 10% level.

To summarize, our econometric analysis do suggest that individuals have learned from both introspection, observation and feedback.

**Miscellany.** We have also controlled for individual characteristics. The influence of the degree a subject was studying for is relatively small. Only medical students and, to some extent, engineering students are performing better than students with other backgrounds. The marginal effect of training in higher level maths shows the expected sign without being significant.

We find a surprisingly strong gender effect, however. Depending on the econometric model, males have a higher probability of correctly inferring their hat color (significant at 1 %-level in all models), with an effect ranging from 0.14 to 0.18. We have no explanation for this strong gender effect.<sup>35</sup>

Before the actual decision rounds, we asked subjects two control questions, which show whether the subjects understood the instructions and the screen layout. As expected, students who correctly answered these questions had a higher probability of correctly inferring their hat color, although this result was not significant in the Logit and Probit models.

Lastly, in our initial regressions, we included the independent variable “*Time first choice*,” measuring the time (in seconds) a subject took to make his first announcement in each puzzle. In the pooled Probit and Logit models, the time taken for the first announcement negatively influences the likelihood of solving a puzzle ( $p < 0.01$ , Wald test). This variable proxies unobserved subject-specific characteristics such as intrinsic logical skill, understanding of the presentation of the puzzles, or confidence in their own inferences. Moreover, the variable “Time first choice” is highly correlated within a subject and across puzzles. However, allowing for subject-specific random intercepts (the panel models with random effects), the variable “Time first choice” becomes statistically insignificant, as the unobserved heterogeneity in subject-specific characteristics is now absorbed by the random effects. The

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<sup>35</sup>Note, however, that in our companion paper, there is no gender effect, while all other determinants of correctly inferring one hat’s color are similar.

correlation within a subject is now captured by the within-subject correlation coefficient  $\rho$ , which is highly significant and around 0.5 in all our panel models. This indicates that there is some consistency within subjects: correctly solving a certain puzzle increases the likelihood of solving another puzzle. The next section investigates whether this consistency within subjects can be exploited to derive a measure of the degree of logical omniscience.


## 5 Logical omniscience: a measure

In this section, we construct two simple measures of logical omniscience so as to quantify the number of steps of iterative reasoning an individual is able to perform.

Each puzzle can be parameterized by a pair  $(m, n)$ , where  $m$  is the number of red hats a subject observes and  $n$  is the actual number of red hats ( $n = m + 1$  or  $n = m$ ). Remember that if a subject observes  $m$  red hats,  $m + 1$  iterations are required to correctly infer his hat color: the higher  $m$  is, the more complex the chain of reasoning is.

The first index we construct supposes that if an individual can solve a puzzle requiring  $m$  iterations, he must solve all puzzles requiring  $m' < m$  iterations. The degree of logical omniscience of an individual is then given by the number of iterations required to solve the most difficult puzzle the individual can solve, conditional on having correctly solved all puzzles requiring less iterations. So, for instance, if an individual has solved all puzzles requiring one or two steps of reasoning, but fails to solve a puzzle requiring three steps, his degree of logical omniscience is two. This index is very conservative, as a subject, who failed to correctly solve the easiest puzzle, has a degree of 0 regardless of whether he has solved any (or even all) other puzzles. The first puzzle an individual fails is thus interpreted as the upper bound on his ability to perform iterative reasoning, regardless of his performance in the other puzzles. Moreover, this index does not take into account intermediate steps: either an individual correctly infers the color of his hat or not. Failure to correctly infer one's hat color is considered as a complete failure. Figure 4 presents the distribution of our index in our sample (top panel).

We can note that there are two modes, one at 1 and one at 2 in the first sequence, and a single mode at 2 in the second sequence. The (arithmetic) mean for our conservative index is 1.79 in the first sequence, 2.67 in the second sequence, and 2.17 overall. Since the index gives a lower bound on an individual's ability, individuals are thus able to perform at least two iterations of reasoning on average.



**Figure 4:** Two indices of logical omniscience

Our second index is less conservative. With our second index, we count the number  $k$  of puzzles an individual has correctly solved and assume that the individual has solved the  $k$  easiest puzzles. The index is then given by  $(k + 1)/2$ . So, for instance, if an individual has correctly solved 4 puzzles in the first sequence, we assume that he has solved all puzzles requiring one and two steps and one puzzle requiring three steps, so that his degree of logical omniscience is 2.5. In particular, with this index, we partly impute the failure to solve puzzles of a given complexity to mistakes (trembles) rather than sheer inability. Figure 4 presents the distribution of our index in our sample (bottom panel).

We can note that there are two modes, one at 2 and one at 3.5 in the first sequence, and a single mode at 4 in the second sequence. The (arithmetic) mean is 2.41 in the first sequence, 2.96 in the second sequence and 2.65 overall. The percentage of answers consistent with our underlying assumption of monotonicity is 61.7 % in the first sequence, 82.2 % in the second sequence and 70.5 % overall.<sup>36</sup> To further check the robustness of our two indices, note that

<sup>36</sup>The answers of an individual are said to be consistent if there exists a threshold  $m^*$  such that he solves

the Spearman correlation coefficient of our two indices is 0.8519 with  $p < 0.0001$ . The two indices are highly correlated.

Although it is hard to compare our results with the existing literature on iterative reasoning in games (see chapter 5 of Camerer (2003) for a survey), our experiment suggests that individuals are able to perform more iterations than previously thought. In previous studies between one and two steps seemed to be the norm (see Nagel (1995), Figure 2, p 1317 for an example). Controlling for preferences and beliefs about the rationality of others therefore turns out to be important. (See our previous discussion.)

## 6 Conclusion

Logical omniscience is the ability to draw all logical conclusions from one's knowledge. For instance, if a logically omniscient individual knows that his opponents are rational and knows that they know that he is rational, then he infers that his opponents will not play strictly dominated strategies. Logically omniscient and rational individuals are the ideal of Game Theory: the Homo Strategicus. To measure the extent to which individuals are rational and logically omniscient, this paper designed an experiment, a variant of the Red Hat puzzle, controlling for other-regarding preferences and beliefs about the rationality of others. Controlling for other-regarding preferences and beliefs about the rationality of others is essential. Failure to properly control for those confounding factors might otherwise lead to underestimating the real ability of individuals. Our index measuring the ability of individuals to perform iterations of reasoning show that individuals can perform more iterations than previously thought. Moreover, individuals did learn how to perform more iterations of reasoning from both introspection and feedback.

We believe that our measure of logical omniscience together with measures of other-regarding preferences might prove extremely useful in explaining deviations from equilibrium behavior in games. Preliminary results from another study (Bayer and Renou, 2008) suggest that uncertainty about the rationality and omniscience of others is a key determinant for why people deviate from equilibrium play. This observation seems to confirm earlier results reported in Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Costa-Gomez et al. (2001).

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all puzzles requiring  $m \leq m^*$  iterations, and fails all other puzzles.

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## 7 Appendix

**Below you see a possible situation. The two following questions test whether you understand the setup of the environment for the experiment. Failing to answer these questions correctly may lead to exclusion from the experiment.**

	You	Computer 1	Computer 2	Computer 3
Suppose this is the true situation	RED	WHITE	RED	WHITE

<p><i>Which of the panels below (A to E) describes what YOU initially know if the situation above is true?</i></p> <p><input type="radio"/> Panel A</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Panel B</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Panel C</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Panel D</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Panel E</p>	<p><i>Which of the panels below (A to E) describes what COMPUTER 2 initially knows if the situation above is true?</i></p> <p><input type="radio"/> Panel A</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Panel B</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Panel C</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Panel D</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Panel E</p>
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	You	Computer 1	Computer 2	Computer 3
(Panel A)	??	??	RED	??
(Panel B)	??	WHITE	??	WHITE
(Panel C)	RED	WHITE	RED	WHITE
(Panel D)	??	WHITE	RED	WHITE
(Panel E)	RED	WHITE	??	WHITE

**Figure 5:** Screenshot of control questions

**THIS IS THE 3RD DECISION ROUND IN THIS GAME!!!**  
**There is at least one RED hat.**

	You	Computer 1	Computer 2	Computer 3
<i>You see this</i>	??	RED	RED	WHITE

*Announcements in previous Rounds*

	You	Computer 1	Computer 2	Computer 3
<i>Announcements 1</i>	I Can't know	I Can't know	I Can't know	I Can't know
<i>Announcements 2</i>	I Can't know	RED	RED	I Can't know

What can you infer?

- I have a WHITE hat with certainty
- I have a RED hat with certainty
- I can't possibly know

OK

**Figure 6:** A screenshot