Ludovic Renou |
Noteworthy:
: We have three openings in the department: one chair in Economics and two New Blood lecturerships. You can find more information here for the lecturerships and here for the chair. Contact me if you want more information.
Some pictures of the Midlands Game Theory Workshop I recently organized: Picture 1, Picture 2 and Picture 3.
Following the workshop on minimax regret at the European University Institute (March 2007),
Karl Schlag and I have created a website.
You can find a very extensive bibliography on minimax regret and related concepts.
I am a member of the Economic Design Network (and was board member from 01/06 to 03/07) , Australia. Do not hesitate to visit our website, and join us.
RESEARCH
Published or forthcoming papers
"Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," with K. H. Schlag, April 2008 (Revised February 2009),
forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory. The paper is available here.
Slides.
"Bilateral Commitment," with Sophie Bade and Guillaume Haeringer, December 2005
(revised April 2009), forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory. (An older version with further results is available
here.)
Measuring the depth of iteration in humans
(joint with R.C Bayer) in
L. Oxley and D. Kulasiri (Eds.), Proceedings of MODSIM 2007 International Congress on Model-
ling and Simulation, pp. 379-385.
"Commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 66, No 1, May 2009.
Older version:
![[PDF]](pdf.gif)
.
"Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Vol. 36, No 3, September, 2008.
Older version:
. Technical Appendix
.
"More strategies, more Nash equilibria," (with Sophie Bade and Guillaume Haeringer),
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 135, No 1, July 2007. Older version:
.
Technical Appendix
.
"Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information:
an example," (joint with Guillaume Carlier), Economic Theory, 28 (2), June, 2006. Older version:
.
Technical appendix
"A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions,"
(joint with Guillaume Carlier), Economic Theory, 2005, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 497-504.
"A Didactic Example of Linear (Multidimensional) Screening Contracts,"
International Journal of Business and Economics, 2003, vol.2, no.3, pp. 245-261.
"Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in CSV models,"
(joint with Guillaume Carlier), Economics Bulletin, 2003, Vol. 7, No. 5, pp. 1-9.
(Please, note an unfortunate mistake. On page 2, you have to read "integral of u(w)mu(w)dw > u(0)")
Current projects
NB: As a rule of thumb, I only post "nearly submittable" papers on my webpage. However, you can get an idea on some of the projects I am currently working on by having a look at the titles below. (I am mainly working on implementation issues at the moment. In particular, I am working towards a theory of behavior-proof mechanism design. Not much success so far, I must say!!)
"Minimax regret implementation," with K.H Schlag, Revised October 2009.
: The paper is available here.
"Ordients: Optimization and Comparative Statics without Utility Functions," with K.H Schlag, October 2008
(revised August 2009).
The paper is available here.
Slides. A note on related concepts here.
"Implementation in Mixed Nash equilibrium," with C. Mezzetti, October 2008 (Revised April 2009) .
The paper is available here.
[Note: we are currently revising the paper and, in particular, adding results about implementation with finite mechanisms. It is proving more
difficult than expected. ]
"Mechanism design and communication networks," with T. Tomala, September 2008 (Revised March 2009).
The paper is available here. Slides. [Currently under revision.]
"Nash implementation and communication networks," October 2008.
This paper studies the problem of full implementation of social choice correspondences on general communication networks.
See also "Mechanism and communication networks." Slides. I am currently adding new
results regarding the use of general mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms for which the set of messages a player can send can depend on the messages he received)
and sequential equilibrium, much in the spirit of ``subgame perfection implementation.''
(Available very soon. Send me an e-mail if you want to have a look
at the current version.)
"Group formation and governance," April 2008 (revised May 2008).
The paper is available here.
"Homo Sapiens Sapiens meets Homo Strategicus at the laboratory," with R. Bayer, April 2008
(Revised May 2009). The paper is available here. [Currently under revision]
TEACHING
Academic year 2009-2010: I will be teaching an introductory course to Game Theory (EC3043).
Academic year 2008-2009: I am teaching an introductory course to Game Theory (EC3043).
Academic year 2007-2008: I taught an introductory course to Game Theory (EC3043) and an advanced course on Game Theory (EC7089).
Academic year 2005-2006: "Mathematical Economics II" (Syllabus
). Mid-term test 2006 and
solutions:
Academic year: 2004-2005:
In the second semester, I was teaching an introductory course on Game Theory.
CAVEAT: Despite the suggestive and perhaps tempting title for this course "Strategic thinking for decision making",
this course is not about making better decisions. I am not a guru!! Before taking this course,
I strongly encourage you to read the paper
"Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist " by Ariel Rubinstein. (Syllabus
.)
In the second part of the semester, I also taught some selected topics in Game Theory to Ph.D. students.
In the first semester, I was teaching "Mathematical Economics II" (Syllabus
) and "Selected Topics
in Real Analysis and Probability Theory". I will use the book of Efe Ok
"Real Analysis and Probability Theory with Economic Applications"
for this latter course. I have also taught Principle of Economics to MBA students in Hong-Kong.
In 2004, I taught Game Theory. You can download the outline
.
Exam 2004
Solution 2004
USEFUL LINKS
- Guillaume Haeringer, a co-author
- Tristan Tomala
- Olivier Gossner
- Pierpaolo Battigalli
- Jean-Marc Tallon
- Larry Samuelson
- Martin Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
- Stephen Morris
- Douglas Gale
- Joe Halpern
- Faruk Gul
- Marco Scarsini
- Johan Van Benthem
- Paul Milgrom
- Game theory webpage
MISCELLANY
- Axiom 1: When one author writes to a co-author, it is completely indifferent whether he is right or wrong.
- Axiom 2: When one author receives a letter (e-mail, nowadays) from a co-author, he is under no obligation whatsoever to read it, let alone to answer it.
- Axiom 3: It is preferable that each author works on different parts (aspects) of the research project.
- Axiom 4: It does not matter who contributes what.
Some "new world" wines that I have recently tried and liked. Scorpo Pinot Noir, 2003, Mornington Peninsula,
Victoria, Australia. Koltz, Shiraz and Viognier, Adelaide Hills, SA, Australia. A must try: wines from
Pondalowie vineyard (Victoria); Dominic and Krystina Morris are simply making superb wines.
CONTACT
Department of Economics
Astley Clarke Building
University of Leicester
University Road
Leicester LE1 7RH
UK
Telephone: +44 (0) 116 252 3980
Facsimile: TBA
Economics Home>University Home
UPDATED: September 2009
Ludovic Renou
The views expressed in this document are those of the document owner.